SIMULATING CONSCIOUSNESS — THE HARD PROBLEM

An awake brain and an anaesthetised one differ in numbers you can actually measure: network synchrony and integration collapse as the drug takes hold. Charting such correlations is work neuroscience can do, and Chalmers in 1995 called that whole family the easy problems. The hard problem sits elsewhere: knowing exactly which neurons fire still does not tell you why that physical arrangement comes with a feeling, precisely the gap Levine described in 1983. Global workspace theory and integrated information Φ remain contested hypotheses, and neither has closed the gap.

▸ Building a living neural network (measurable)…
▸ Wiring the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC)
▸ Installing the subjective-experience screen (qualia)
▸ Placing the ❓ "explanatory gap" in the middle
▸ Loading theories (GWT · IIT — all HYPOTHESES)…
▸ Ready — Online. ✅
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Room Consciousness

The Hard Problem of Consciousness
Online
easy vs hard · NCC · the gap
Neural indices (measurable)
🧠 synchrony · Φ integration
State—
Sync / Integration—
Theory in view—
Problem—
Measurable?—
Viewing—
The honest boundary
We can measure the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) — objective, third-person. BUT why physical activity produces subjective experience ("the feeling") has NO solution — the "hard problem" (Chalmers 1995). Every theory below is a HYPOTHESIS under study.
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LEFT = brain (measurable) · RIGHT = subjective experience · MIDDLE = ❓. Toggle "State" (awake/anesthetized) or pick a "Scenario"; click a concept for details. Theories = HYPOTHESES.
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Neural activity / synchrony over time (EEG-like) awake = strong, regular · anesthetized = weak, fragmented
About Consciousness

An awake brain and an anaesthetised one differ in numbers you can actually measure: network synchrony and integration collapse as the drug takes hold. Charting such correlations is work neuroscience can do, and Chalmers in 1995 called that whole family the easy problems. The hard problem sits elsewhere: knowing exactly which neurons fire still does not tell you why that physical arrangement comes with a feeling, precisely the gap Levine described in 1983. Global workspace theory and integrated information Φ remain contested hypotheses, and neither has closed the gap.

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